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The Subprime Crisis and the Link between Consumer 
Financial Protection and Systemic Risk 
Erik F. Gerding
This Article argues that the current global financial crisis, which was 
first called the “subprime crisis,” demonstrates the need to revisit the divi-
sion between financial regulations designed to protect consumers from ex-
cessively risky loans and safety-and-soundness regulations intended to pro-
tect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions.  Consumer 
financial protection can, and must, serve a role not only in protecting indi-
viduals from excessive risk, but also in protecting markets from systemic 
risk.  Economic studies indicate it is not merely high rates of defaults on 
consumer loans, but highly correlated defaults that create risks for lenders 
and investors in asset-backed securities.  Consumer financial regulations 
can mitigate these risks.   
The Article argues: 
 “predatory lending” can constitute a collective action failure by 
lenders; 
  consumer behavioral biases may frustrate attempts to mitigate risk 
to purchasers of asset-backed securities that focus solely on improving 
information on the risks of underlying consumer loans; but, 
  consumer financial rules that take into account these biases and ad-
dress the “menu design” of consumer loan choices may not only pro-
tect consumers, but make the risks of consumer defaults more predict-
able. 
The Article also draws tentative conclusions on the implications of the 
link between consumer protection and systemic risk for the institutional 
reform of financial regulation by:  
suggesting that a diverse set of regulators may remedy high correla-
tions of consumer lending practices and the risks posed by highly cor-
related consumer default; and 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.  The author would like 
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arguing against federal preemption of state consumer regulation. 
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a historical division in financial regulation between 
regulations designed to protect consumers and regulations intended to pro-
tect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions.  This Ar-
ticle argues that the current global financial crisis, which was first called the 
“subprime crisis,” demonstrates the need to revisit this division.  More par-
ticularly, this Article argues that consumer financial protection can, and 
must, serve a role not only in protecting individuals from excessive risk, but 
also in protecting markets from systemic risk.  This additional role for con-
sumer financial protection provides additional, novel support for promoting 
vigorous and diverse consumer regulations. 
This Article defines consumer financial protection laws and regula-
tions as legal rules designed to prevent individual borrowers from taking on 
excessive risk.1  These rules address lending practices that are sometimes 
labeled as unfair, abusive, or predatory, and are often justified on efficiency 
grounds.2  For example, consumer financial protection laws may address 
either information asymmetries that prevent consumers from understanding 
1 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008) 
(proposing a new financial regulator to protect consumers from risk posed by credit products).  Con-
sumer financial law covers a broad range of concerns, many of which lie beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle.  For example, this Article does not address financial laws or regulations intended to:  
 ensure wide consumer access to credit (including regulations that either combat racial discrim-
ination by lenders that denies consumers credit or address the fairness of private credit reports 
on consumers); 
 govern consumer banking and payment transactions; 
 address debt collection  or foreclosure practices; or 
 regulate consumer bankruptcy. 
 Nevertheless, lender practices in these areas might also contribute to the phenomenon that is the 
subject of this article – excessive consumer defaults that threaten the solvency of financial institutions.  
More particularly, this Article focuses on consumer credit products and consumer lending practices that 
lead to a high level of market-wide consumer defaults that are both unpredictable and highly correlated.  
See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. 
2 E.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Econom-
ics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (arguing that predatory lending represents a 
market failure).   
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the risk of a particular loan,3 or behavioral biases and cognitive limitations 
that cause consumers to act against their long-term self interest.4
As Part II.B explains, a separate set of financial laws and regulations 
address systemic risk.  Scholars have defined systemic risk as the risk of 
market-wide losses or the breakdown of financial markets.5  Because sys-
temic risk threatens the entire market, diversification does not adequately 
protect investors.6  To address systemic risk, financial regulations focus on 
the “safety and soundness” of financial institutions.7  By ensuring the finan-
cial health of institutions, systemic risk regulations attempt to protect finan-
cial markets from the collapse of a significant institution.8
There is a tension between the objectives of protecting consumers and 
ensuring the financial health of individual financial institutions.  As Profes-
sor Adam Levitin notes, lending practices that extract additional value from 
consumers strengthen the balance sheets of lenders.9  This means that ef-
forts to clamp down on lending practices to protect consumers could ad-
versely impact the finances of financial institutions.  
But, there is little empirical evidence that consumer protection efforts 
have ever threatened the stability of a financial institution to a degree that 
increases systemic risk.  In fact, this Article argues that consumer financial 
protection is not antithetical to, but, in fact, represents a critical tool in miti-
gating systemic risk.  When widespread consumer credit products or lend-
ing practices induce high levels of consumer default, the safety and sound-
3 E.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 5 (arguing that market for consumer credit fails when 
consumers are not optimally informed); Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole 
Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 
181-82 (2008) (noting that Truth in Lending Act was intended to address information asymmetries that 
prevented consumers from understanding loan terms). 
4 E.g., Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory 
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 (2006) (using theories from behavioral economics to explain preda-
tory lending). 
Many consumer financial protection laws are also plainly grounded in paternalism.  Cf. Joshua D. 
Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: an Empirical Perspec-
tive, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 470 (2007) (challenging empirical foundations of behavioral critiques of 
consumer credit markets).   
5 George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators 
Retard or Contribute to It, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 371 (2003) (defining systemic risk as “the risk of a break-
down in an entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components”).  See also 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO L.J. 193 (2008).  
6 Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 200.
7 See Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 75 
U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 967 (2007) (equating banking law concerns with “safety and soundness” of banks 
with systemic risk). 
8 Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 372, 385 (discussing regulations designed to prevent chain 
failures of financial institutions). 
9 Adam Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. REG. __ 
(forthcoming 2009). 
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ness of financial institutions can be threatened.10  Systemic risk can thus 
arise when consumer defaults threaten either one important financial insti-
tution (and that failure, in turn, threatens other institutions) or a number of 
institutions simultaneously.11
Both pathways to systemic risk point to a need to refine when con-
sumer default can lead to market-wide losses; it is not merely a high inci-
dence of consumer default that poses systemic risk.  Instead, systemic risk 
becomes a problem when the level of consumer default exceeds the predic-
tions of financial institutions and when these consumer defaults are highly 
correlated.  If financial institutions underestimate consumer defaults, they 
cannot manage risk effectively.12  Risk management is similarly frustrated 
by highly correlated consumer defaults; high correlation of defaults within a 
financial institution’s portfolio undermines diversification as defaulting 
loans are not offset by loans that continue to repay.13  High correlation of 
defaults across a market means that multiple financial institutions face 
losses at the same time.14  The securitization of consumer loans both makes 
predicting the consequences of consumer default much more difficult15 and 
increases the dangers of high default correlations;16 securitization thus mag-
10 Professor Levitin recognizes this potential confluence.  
11 These two potential links between consumer default and systemic risk correspond with two of 
the pathways for systemic risk described by Professors Kaufman and Scott.  Among the three ways that 
systemic risk can arise, include a failure of one important institution leading to a chain reaction of fail-
ures by other inter-connected institutions and failures by multiple institutions that arise from an external 
“shock” and “similarities in third-party risk exposures” among those institutions.  Kaufman & Scott, 
supra note 5, at 372-73. 
12 If a financial institution could adequately measure the risks posed by consumer defaults either 
directly to the institution itself or indirectly to the institution’s counterparties, then the institution could 
hedge appropriately.  See Erik F. Gerding, The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and 
the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing challenges faced by 
financial institution risk models in measuring impact of defaults on underlying mortgages on asset-
backed securities). 
13 Id. See also Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 
(2009) (describing how correlation among losses on underlying assets undermines efficient risk spread-
ing in securitization and can lead to severe errors in estimating losses on asset-backed securities); Eva 
Porras, The Role of Correlation in the Current Credit Ratings Squeeze (IE Business School, Working 
Paper No. WP08-10, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134488 
(analyzing role of default correlations in subprime portfolios in wave of ratings downgrades of asset-
backed securities in current crisis); Adrian M. Cowan & Charles D. Cowan, Default Correlation: an 
Empirical Investigation of a Subprime Lender, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 753 (2004) (finding high default 
correlation in portfolio of single subprime lender studied).  
14 See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 373 (describing systemic risk arising from financial 
institutions with correlated exposures to third-party defaults); cf. Mark Carey, Dimensions of Credit Risk 
and their Relationship to Economic Capital Requirements, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS 
AND WHAT DOESN’T (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001) (detailing how errors in assumption on credit risk 
correlations in financial risk models that would be used to set regulatory capital under Basel Accords 
may lead to significant errors).  
15 See Gerding, supra note 12. 
16 Coval et al., supra note 13.   
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nifies the consequences for systemic risk of consumers taking on excessive-
ly risky loans.17
The current financial crisis, which started with subprime mortgages 
and spread to financial institutions that held securities backed by those 
mortgages,18 provides stark evidence of the link between the failure of con-
sumer financial protection and threats to entire financial markets.  Just be-
fore the crisis, U.S. bank regulators began to recognize the possible risks 
posed by subprime lending and securitization to the safety and soundness of 
financial institutions,19 but the severity of the financial crisis shows that 
regulators need to move beyond baby steps and redouble efforts to address 
systemic risk through consumer protection. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part II sketches the basic division in 
U.S. financial regulation between laws designed to protect consumers and 
those designed to mitigate systemic risk; Part III describes the rise of sub-
prime lending, particularly subprime mortgage lending,20 and how the secu-
ritization fueled that rise;21 Part III underscores the risks posed by highly 
correlated consumer defaults in subprime markets and also provides a brief 
explanation of how the financial crisis started with defaults in subprime 
mortgages and spread to financial institutions;22 Part IV argues that the cur-
rent financial crisis demonstrates the need to enlist consumer financial pro-
tection in efforts to mitigate systemic risk and that policies based on im-
proving the “menu design” of consumer borrowing options can prove par-
17 Cf. Rob Nijskens & Wolf Wagner, Credit Risk Transfer Activities and Systemic Risk: How 
Banks Became Less Risky Individually but Posed Greater Risks to the Financial System at the Same 
Time (Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1319689 (positing that credit risk transfers by financial institutions, including via 
securitization, counterintuitively may increase systemic risk by making bank risk profiles more corre-
lated with one another).  
18 See infra Part III (provides a thumbnail sketch of the beginnings of the current global financial 
crisis in the subprime mortgage market).   
19 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 1290-91.  As Professors Engel and McCoy note, “In 
January 2001, federal banking regulators increased the capital requirements for all institutions with 
subprime lending programs that equaled or exceeded 25% of their tier one regulatory capital.” Id. at 
1291, n.155 (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET AL., EXPANDED 
GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2, 5-6 (2001)).  However, it is unclear how diligently 
bank examiners followed this examination guidance.   
Professors McCoy and Engel also note that regulators proposed several rules that would require 
subprime lenders to collect data on their loans or mortgages.  Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 1291, 
n.155.  Finally, bank regulators issued interagency guidance on capital requirements for financial institu-
tions to cover risks posed by asset-backed securities held by those institutions.  Id. (citing Federal Re-
serve System, Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, Capital Adequacy Guidelines, Capital Maintenance, 
Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations, 
66 Fed. Reg. 59, 614 (Nov. 29, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225). 
20 See infra Part III.A.  
21 See infra Parts III.B (describing the mechanics of securitization) and III.C (describing how 
securitization fueled subprime lending).    
22 See infra Part III.C.  
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ticularly valuable in fighting systemic risk;23 Part V analyzes the implica-
tions of employing consumer financial protection law as a tool to mitigate 
systemic risk for the current debate over reorganizing financial regulators; 
and Part VI concludes. 
II.  THE DIVIDE BETWEEN CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND 
REGULATIONS ON SYSTEMIC RISK 
The current structure of financial regulation treats the protection of 
consumers from unfair lending practices and the protection of financial 
markets from systemic risk as two distinct objectives.  This division appears 
both in different statutory and regulatory frameworks and in the allocation 
of responsibility among and within different financial regulators.  The fol-
lowing paragraphs provide just a sketch of this division. 
A.  Consumer Protection 
An array of federal and state laws addresses protecting consumer bor-
rowers from abusive, unfair or predatory lending practices.  A basic distinc-
tion can be made between laws that regulate the substance of the consumer 
loan terms and those that require that lenders make certain disclosure to 
consumers.  Substantive regulation of consumers has its origins in usury 
statutes, which survive in state law.24  (But scholars have noted a dilution in 
state usury prohibitions, due in part to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Marquette National Bank,25 which permits national banks to export the 
usury law of the states in which they are chartered.26  This decision encour-
aged both lenders to relocate to states with higher or no interest rate ceilings 
and states to dilute their usury laws, phenomena some scholars have de-
scribed as a “race-to-the bottom.”27  Moreover, state interest rate caps were 
preempted by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
                                                                                                                           
 23 See infra Part IV.F. 
 24 Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience 
Distortion of American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1116-22 (2008) (surveying histor-
ical development of state usury laws in the United States through the present).  
 25 Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
 26 Id. at 318-19.  See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 148 (2004) 
(analyzing how banks have been able to export the usury law of the state in which they are chartered 
because of Marquette decision).  Professor Barr also notes that regulations of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency that assert federal preemption of state consumer protection laws have built 
on the Marquette decision.  Id. 
 27 Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory 
Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2005).   See also Elizabeth R. Schlitz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-
Expanding Exportation Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 
(2004).   
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trol Act,28 a statute that was critical in spurring the growth of subprime lend-
ing.29  
Federal consumer financial protection focuses primarily on required 
disclosure to consumers of the lending terms.  Most notably, the Truth in 
Lending Act30 and related federal regulations31 set forth detailed standards 
for disclosures by lenders in consumer credit transactions.    
B.  Systemic Risk 
Federal and state regulations of banks and other financial institutions 
address systemic risk by limiting risk-taking by those institutions.  Systemic 
risk regulations include regulations that focus on the “safety and sound-
ness” of banks and other financial institutions (e.g., insurance companies) 
whose collapse may have broad spillover effects on financial markets.32  
These risk regulations fall into several broad categories, including the fol-
lowing: 
 regulations that limit financial institutions to particular lines of 
business to shield them from excessive losses and to allow regula-
tors to better assess the risks that the institutions face;33   
 restrictions on the types of investments that financial institutions 
may make, which include prohibitions on investments in real es-
tate34 and riskier classes of securities, such as equity;35 
 prudential restrictions on the number of loans to certain types of 
borrowers;36 and 
 capital requirements for financial institutions.37   
                                                                                                                           
 28 Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 29 Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mort-
gage Market, 88 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 38 (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf.     
 30 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2008).  
 31 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2008). 
 32 See Feibelman, supra note 7, at 967.  
 33 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (enumerating powers of national banks). 
 34 E.g., 12. U.S.C. § 29 (2008) (restricting ability of national banks to invest in real estate).  
 35 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (specifying categories of securities investments which national 
banks are permitted to make). 
 36 For example, federal banking laws limit the loans that banks may have outstanding to one 
borrower.  12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1464(u) (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2008).  Another set of laws restrict a 
bank’s loans to other depositary institutions to prevent the collapse of one institution from threatening 
others.  12 U.S.C. § 371b-2 (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 206 (2008).     
 37 Requiring that institutions maintain a certain amount of capital to match the risks on their 
balance sheet ensures that they have a cushion against losses that would push the institutions towards 
insolvency and threaten their depositors, creditors, and other institutions.  Capital requirements are a 
centerpiece of federal banking regulation.  E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831(o)(c)(1) (requiring federal bank regu-
lators to establish capital requirements for supervised banks). But capital requirements also feature 
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These regulations are buttressed by the general powers of a regulator 
to inspect financial institutions for safety and soundness38 and to revoke an 
institution’s license, assume control of its operations, or shut it down if the 
regulator finds concerns.39  Deposit insurance and other government guaran-
tees of financial institutions provide yet another backstop against systemic 
risk by mitigating the threat of bank runs.40  Yet, the moral hazard created 
by this insurance means that the regulators providing the backstop must 
actively use other regulations to restrict excessive risk-taking.41  Finally, 
central banks attempt to mitigate systemic risk by serving as lenders of last 
resort.42     
C.  When a Regulator Has Both a Consumer Protection and Systemic      
Risk Mission 
A number of banking regulators have both consumer protection and 
systemic risk mitigation (safety and soundness) in their statutory missions.  
But, as Professor Levitin argues, these missions can conflict.   
[T]he safety-and-soundness mission is incompatible with consumer 
protection because practices that might be profitable and thus increase 
banks’ safety-and-soundness might also be profitable and thus in-
crease banks’ safety-and-soundness might also be abusive and unfair 
to consumers.  For example, banks might not engage in the most stre-
nuous anti-fraud practices because it might not be as profitable as al-
regulation of other types of financial institutions.  For example, the SEC imposes capital requirements 
on registered broker-dealers.  Net Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 
(2009). 
38 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4517 (2008) (mandating annual examination of government sponsored enti-
ties for safety and soundness).  See also Tamar Frankel, Regulating the Financial Markets by Examina-
tions, (B. U. Sch. L. Working Paper No. 09-08, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1339913 (arguing that securities regulators should 
use regulatory examinations similar to safety and soundness examinations by federal bank regulators to 
mitigate the risk of asset price bubbles and financial market crashes). 
39 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (2008) (requiring federal bank regulators to set safety-and-soundness 
standards for insured depositary institutions); § 1818 (setting standards for termination of deposit insur-
ance status); § 1831o (setting standards for “prompt corrective action” by insured depositary institu-
tions).  See also Frankel, at supra note 38. 
40 See Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 210.  But cf. Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 381 (arguing 
that deposit insurance is unnecessary and counterproductive in mitigating systemic risk). 
41 RIK W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: AN ENCYLOPEDIA 270-71 (2005) (analyzing 
potential moral hazard created by deposit insurance).  For a few of the statutory provisions that address 
moral hazard with respect to insured institutions, see supra note 39. 
42 For an economic analysis of this lender of last resort role and the concept of systemic risk in 
general, see Olivier De Bandt & Phillip Hartmann, Systemic Risk in Banking: a Survey, in FINANCIAL 
CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 249, 260  (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing 
eds., 2002). 
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lowing a certain level of fraud. . . . Safety-and-soundness and con-
sumer protection would thus push for different regulatory outcomes.43   
He further argues that, faced with this conflict, bank regulators often 
give priority to protecting against systemic risk. 
Placing the two missions together in a single agency ensures that one 
will trump the other, and historically consumer protection has not won 
out. . . .  Federal banking regulators have the authority to regulate for 
consumer protection, but are not motivated to do so, in part because of 
its conflict with their safety-and-soundness mission. . . .44
Professor Levitin acknowledges that there may be an alignment be-
tween consumer protection and safety-and-soundness missions because 
excessive defaults may threaten financial institutions.45   
Nevertheless, Professor Levitin maintains that the potential conflict 
between the two missions explains why federal bank regulators have either 
refrained from fully enforcing consumer protection laws and regulations in 
their mandate or, in some cases, actively worked to roll back consumer pro-
tection laws.  As an example of a regulator that both failed to enforce and 
actively undermined consumer protection laws, Professor Levitin cites the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).  In particular, he faults 
the Comptroller of the Currency for asserting that federal banking laws 
preempt state consumer financial protections.46  (The OCC won a major 
victory in its efforts to preempt state consumer regulations, in 2007, when 
the Supreme Court ruled in Watters v. Wachovia Bank47 that state regulation 
of a state-chartered mortgage subsidiary of a national bank was preempted 
by the National Bank Act.48).   
43 Levitin, supra note 9, at 19.  Professor Levitin explains that the interests of banks and investors 
in preventing fraud may diverge with the following economic analysis: From a bank’s perspective, there 
is an optimal level of fraud, which is not zero.  “After a certain point, the cost of preventing the marginal 
fraud outweighs its benefit.  From a safety and soundness perspective, a bank should not overinvest in 
anti-fraud security.  But from a consumer perspective, the optimal level of fraud is likely zero, especially 
if consumers bear the risk of fraud loss.”  Id.     
44 Id.
45 Id., n.58.  Levitin notes, however, that this alignment may no longer exist.  First, banks no 
longer bear the risk of excessive defaults on consumer loans when they sell those loans to securitization 
vehicles.  Second, defaults on some loans, such as credit card debt, generate profits for banks through 
penalties. Id. (citing Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweatbox” of Credit Card Debt,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375). 
46 See Levitin, supra note 9. 
47 550 U.S. 1 (2007).  
48 See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of 
State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893 (2008) (criticizing Watters as part of larger 
legal movement to preempt state banking regulation).  But, perhaps, the most important milestone in 
federal preemption occurred in 1980, when the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 preempted state interest rate caps; this legislation represented a critical piece in the 
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Scholars have echoed Professor Levitin’s analysis49 and noted that oth-
er federal banking regulators that have both consumer protection and safety 
and soundness missions have emphasized the latter mission at the expense 
of the former.50
III. SUBPRIME LENDING, SECURITIZATION AND THE START OF THE CRISIS
A.  The Rise of Subprime Mortgage Lending 
The subprime crisis revealed the dangers in separating consumer fi-
nancial protection from addressing systemic risk.  As detailed below, the 
crisis began with consumer defaults on so-called subprime mortgages.  
“Subprime mortgages” can have several definitions, but are often distin-
guished from “prime” mortgages by significantly higher upfront and con-
tinuing costs (including fees and interest rate payments) due to the lower 
creditworthiness of the borrowers.51  The last fifteen years witnessed a 
boom in subprime mortgage lending.52
Many of the mortgages offered to subprime borrowers (and offered to 
other borrowers) had complex interest rate features.   A notable category of 
these complex mortgages, adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”), offered 
buyers low fixed rates on an introductory or “teaser” basis, with interest 
rates converting to a floating, market-based interest rate after a few years.53
ARMs and other “exotic” mortgages would cost borrowers substantial-
ly more over the life of the mortgages than fixed rate mortgages.54  ARMs 
beginning of the subprime mortgage market.  See Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and 
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009).  
49 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 90-95.  
50 Id. at 94-95 (criticizing Federal Reserve’s poor performance in consumer protection due to 
focus on safety and soundness mission); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank 
Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003) (com-
menting on Federal Reserve prioritizing safety and soundness).   
51 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 29, at 32.   These costs can be broken down 
as follows: 
Upfront costs include application fees, appraisal fees, and other fees associated with originating a 
mortgage. The continuing costs include mortgage insurance payments, principle and interest payments, 
late fees and fines for delinquent payments, and fees levied by a locality (such as property taxes and 
special assessments).  Id. 
Other definitions of subprime loans focus on lower creditworthiness of borrowers as measured by 
lower credit rating scores.  E.g. Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 08-25, 
2 Sept. 30,2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1276047.  
52 See Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 29, at 36-40.  
53 Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 123, 144 (2007).  See also Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime 
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (positing that the two defining features of 
subprime mortgage contracts are cost deferral for borrowers and complexity in terms).  
54 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53.  The costs to consumers of ARM loans were recognized in legal 
scholarship over two decades ago.  E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The 
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also meant that borrowers bore significant interest rate risk; if interest rates 
increased after the teaser period expired, then the required interest pay-
ments would rise, potentially beyond the ability of the borrower to repay.55
Rising market interest rates would also foreclose the ability of the borrower 
to refinance or sell the house for more than the value of the mortgage (as 
higher interest rates would decrease the number of buyers in the market).56
The dramatic increase in the lending of these more complex mortgages 
coincided with a boom in other forms of consumer lending, such as credit 
card products, both to subprime borrowers and more creditworthy individu-
als.57  Many of these other credit products also contained complex terms, 
which allowed lenders to reset interest rates or charge various “hidden” fees 
and penalties.58
Consumer law scholars have argued that mortgage and other consumer 
lenders used the complexity of ARMs and consumer credit products to shift 
interest rate risk to, and extract additional revenue from, consumers.59
These scholars argued lenders exploited not only informational asymme-
tries, but the behavioral biases of consumers as well.60  Consumers make 
many decisions in a manner inconsistent with the rational actor models of 
neoclassical economics, these scholars contend; instead, consumers exhibit 
cognitive limitations and take mental shortcuts that cause them to miscalcu-
late financial risks.61  According to these scholars, these behavioral biases 
caused consumer borrowers to agree to provisions in mortgages and other 
consumer debt contracts that they otherwise might not have.62
B. Securitization 
Consumer lending came to have a more direct effect on capital mar-
kets because of the advent of securitization.  Securitization also means that 
Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamices of the Home Sale 
and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1131 (1984). 
55 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53.   
56 See id.
57 For a discussion of rising levels of consumer debt, see Teresa A. Sullivan, Less Stigma or More 
Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59
STAN. L. REV. 213, 229-32 (2006); TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS:
AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000). 
58 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 26-53 (analyzing market failures in consumer credit 
products other than mortgages). 
59 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53. 
60 See id.
61 See Willis, supra note 4, at 754-804 (cataloging behavioral biases afflicting mortgage borrow-
ers). 
62 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 26-53 (analyzing market 
failures in consumer credit products other than mortgages).  For other recent scholarship on the effects 
of behavioral biases on real estate investments, see Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 1047 (2008); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Christian Julliard, Money Illusion and Housing Fren-
zies, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 135 (2008).  
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risks inherent in consumer lending translate more directly into systemic 
risk.   
Securitization represents a process by which loans, mortgages, and 
other credit products that generate predictable future cash streams from 
borrowers are pooled together and sold to an investment vehicle that then 
issues securities to investors.63  The proceeds from the sale of the securities 
fund the purchase of the loan pool by the investment vehicle.64  The asset-
backed securities issued in a securitization are often themselves pooled and 
securitized; this re-securitization of asset-backed securities can, and has 
been, repeated many times over in an iterative fashion.65
Lenders benefit from securitization in several ways.  First, they can 
convert long-term assets (such as mortgages) into short-term, extremely 
liquid assets (i.e., cash).  This can help address a mismatch that many lend-
ers face between short-term liabilities and long-term assets, thereby ad-
dressing a concern of both investors and regulators.66  Second, lenders can 
then channel the cash into new loans and increase their returns on capital.67
Third, lenders can earn fees paid by the investment vehicle for continuing 
to collect and enforce the loans on behalf of the vehicle (“servicing fees”).68
Fourth, lenders use securitization to mitigate and diversify against credit 
risk.  By selling a portion of the loans they make, the lenders mitigate the 
risk that they face of default on those loans, risk which might be overly 
concentrated in certain geographic areas or market segments.69
Securitization thus provides a mechanism to spread risks from lenders 
to investors; through securitization, lenders offload credit risk from mort-
gages, credit card debts, student loans and other credit products to purchas-
ers of asset-backed securities.70    Investors have been willing to bear these 
risks because securitization offers both the rewards of investing in lucrative 
consumer credit markets and the opportunity to diversify against risks.71
63 For a primer on securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994).   
64 See id.
65 See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 1, 15 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1997); Coval et al., supra note 13 
(describing “CDO Squared” securitizations).
66 See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, CORPORATE BONDS AND STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 297-
300 (2004).  
67 See Simon Wolfe, Structural Effects of Asset-Backed Securitisation, 6 EUR. J. FIN. 353 (2000).  
68 CHARLES AUSTIN STONE & ANNE ZISSU, THE SECURITIZATION MARKETS HANDBOOK:
STRUCTURES AND DYNAMICS OF MORTGAGE AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 45 (2005).     
69 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 66, at 300.  
70 See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, 
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008) (describing risk spread-
ing functions of CDOs, a type of securitization, and other financial instruments). 
71 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 66, at 300.  
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An investor in asset-backed securities can diversify against the credit 
risk of consumer mortgages and other loans in three different ways.  First, 
the pooling of loans means that the risk of default on any one loan is offset 
by the payments on non-defaulted loans.  Second, securitization facilitates 
diversification because a purchaser of an asset-backed security is only pur-
chasing a piece of the risk of the mortgage pool.  An investor can diversify 
by balancing the other investments in its portfolio.  Third, and in a related 
vein, an investor can more finely tune the amount of risk in any investment 
in asset-backed securities because these securities are often issued in differ-
ent classes or tranches.  Each tranche has a different priority in rights to 
payments on the underlying loans, with senior tranches receiving payments 
before junior classes are paid.  Each tranche of a securitization thus offers a 
different tradeoff between risk and interest rates (reward).72
But, the success of diversification (and the efficiency of risk spreading 
through securitization) rests on several assumptions.  Among these assump-
tions is that the models used to price asset-backed securities adequately 
measure the risks posed by the underlying loans.73  Furthermore, diversifi-
cation depends on a low, constant, and predictable degree of correlation of 
losses on underlying loans.74  Again, diversification depends in part on 
losses from a default on some loans being offset by continued payments on 
other loans.  When defaults are highly correlated, it no longer rains, it 
pours. 
High default correlations on the assets underlying a securitization can 
create extreme volatility in the losses to asset-backed securities and lead to 
serious underestimation of risk.75  Studies have shown that individual sub-
prime lenders have high correlations of default in their loan portfolios76 and 
that defaults among subprime borrowers are highly correlated (while de-
72 See Gerding, supra note 12.    
73 See id.   
74 See Coval et al., supra note 13.  See also Porras, supra note 13. 
75 See Coval et al., supra note 13 (detailing how small errors in the assumptions of securitization 
models can lead to large miscalculations of losses for asset-backed securities with these miscalculations 
compounded with every re-securitization of those securities); Porras, supra note 13; Gunter Löffler, The 
Effects of Estimation Error on Measures of Portfolio Credit Risk, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1427 (2003) 
(providing statistical analysis that shows how default correlations can lead to errors in estimating credit 
risk in investment portfolio); cf. Darrell Duffie et al., Frailty Correlated Default (Swiss Fin. Inst. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 08-44, 2008), available at 
http://www.finance.ox.ac.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CF97FD7F-2BFB-41CE-B99A-
FF4DE0DEB9BB/0/DarrellDuffie.pdf (finding that standard risk measurement methods severely unde-
restimate probability of default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt, including CDOs, because of 
hidden default correlations).  
76 Adrian M. Cowan & Charles D. Cowan, Default Correlation: An Empirical Investigation of a 
Subprime Lender, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 753 (2004) (finding high default correlation in portfolio of 
single subprime lender studied).   
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faults among more creditworthy borrowers have a much lower correla-
tion).77
Correlation can also defeat diversification across an investor’s portfo-
lio.  When different securities in an investor’s portfolio (for example, dif-
ferent issuances of asset-backed securities) experience high—and highly 
correlated—losses, that investor may lurch towards sudden financial col-
lapse.78  If there is a high degree of correlation among the portfolios of large 
institutional investors, losses in one investment portfolio may presage mar-
ket-wide losses,79 which may cause many investors to sell assets, make 
margin calls, and cut lending simultaneously.
C.  The Connection between Securitization and Subprime Lending 
Scholars have argued that securitization triggered the growth of sub-
prime mortgage lending (and other subprime consumer loans).80  When 
lenders could sell the mortgages they originated, they no longer bore the 
full risk of borrower default and had less incentive to ensure that consumers 
could repay the mortgages.81  Indeed, many mortgage lenders lowered un-
derwriting standards and extended so-called low documentation (“low 
doc”) loans that did not require documentary proof of a borrower’s em-
ployment or other important indicia of creditworthiness.82  Instead of ensur-
77 David K. Musto & Nicholas S. Souleles, A Portfolio View of Consumer Credit, 53 J.
MONETARY ECON. 59, 61-62 (2006) (positing that measuring default risk of consumer loans requires 
determining covariance with aggregate consumer default rates and finding that “consumers with high 
covariance risk tend to also have low credit scores (high default probabilities)”).
78 Insurers face a similar problem in ensuring that losses in their portfolio are not highly corre-
lated.  ZVI BODIE ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS 196 (Richard D. Irwin, 3d ed., 1998). 
79 See supra notes 14, 17 and accompanying text.  See generally Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in 
the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis (Max Planck Inst. for 
Research on Collective Goods Preprint No. 2008/43, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309442.  Professor Hellwig analyzes in depth how 
correlations in various levels of a securitization—from default correlations among underlying loans to 
correlations in prices of asset-backed securities—can undermine diversification, lead to unexpectedly 
large losses for financial institutions, and thus exacerbate systemic risk.  He analyzes how these various 
correlations frustrated risk modeling and contributed to the global financial crisis. 
80 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007); Christopher A. Peterson, Predatory Structured 
Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007). 
81 Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, On “Leveraged 
Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Meltdown,” Remarks at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New 
York, N.Y. (Apr. 8, 2005), availableathttp://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin 
20080229a.htm (discussing incentive problems created by “originate-to-distribute” model). 
82 Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031, 
1045-46 (2007); Alan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How did it Happen and How will it 
End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 13 (2007) (presenting empirical data on low-documentation loans). 
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ing the creditworthiness of borrowers, lenders had an incentive to enter new 
markets, including the subprime market, to generate additional fees.83
Fueled by securitization, the U.S. subprime mortgage market grew 
from miniscule levels to $625 billion in 2005, when it represented one-fifth 
of total annual mortgage originations.84  Economists have noted that the 
subprime mortgage market depended heavily on steady increases in home 
values, which enabled mortgage borrowers—who could not afford the 
higher interest rates when their ARM (or other exotic mortgage) reset— to 
either refinance or sell.85  Housing prices did rise fairly sharply from 1999 
to 2005, with the boom in the last several years fueled in particular by sub-
prime lending.86  Demand by investors for mortgage-backed securities 
spurred additional mortgage lending.87  One group of economists describes 
the interplay of securitization and subprime mortgage lending as a feedback 
loop that created a housing bubble.  They write: 
A critical factor in the bubble was the interaction of financial engi-
neering and deteriorating lending standards in real-estate markets, 
which fed on each other to cause unsustainable price rises, and then 
collapse.  Financial market expansion and innovation provided new 
funding sources and a demand for mortgages for securitization. This 
required the easing of lending standards, which drove prices up. The 
soaring housing prices were both an effect and a cause of too much 
easing as the price rises supported the continued undermining of lend-
ing standards.88
83 Engel & McCoy, supra note 80; Bar-Gill, supra note 53.  Benjamin J. Keys, et al., Did Securi-
tization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093137 (concluding securitiza-
tion did lead to deterioration in credit screening). 
84 Gregory A. Krohn & William R. Gruver, The Complexities of the Financial Turmoil of 2007 
and 2008 9, (Oct. 7, 2008) (unpublished manuscript available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1282250&rec=1&srcabs=1273467).  
85 Gorton, supra note 51, at 5-6.  See also Michel G. Crouhy et al., The Subprime Credit Crisis of 
07, (July 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112467&rec=1&srcabs=1072304). 
86 Krohn & Gruver, supra note 84.  Some economists see housing price increases as driven by a 
feedback loop that is psychological.  See Robert J. Shiller, Understanding Recent Trends in House 
Prices and Home Ownership (Yale Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 28, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017546 (describing evidence that housing price 
increase stemmed from psychological feedback mechanism; increasing asset prices lured investors and 
drove a speculative bubble). 
87 Krohn & Gruver, supra note 84 (describing “shadow banking” system of securitization inves-
tors funding and driving subprime mortgage lending by non-banks); Engel & McCoy, supra note 80, at 
137 (citing reports that excess demand by investors for asset-backed securities led to additional sub-
prime securitizations and lax diligence by investors of credit risk).   
88 Susan M. Wachter et al., Subprime Lending and Real Estate Markets, in MORTGAGE & REAL 
ESTATE FIN. (Stefania Perrucci ed., 2008).  But see Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, Where’s the 
Smoking Gun? A Study of Underwriting Standards for US Subprime Mortgages (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
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The rapid growth of the subprime mortgage market coincided with 
consolidation of market share among lenders.89  One study found a correla-
tion in subprime markets between increases in competition among lenders 
and decreases in underwriting standards.90  As underwriting standards de-
clined, subprime mortgage lenders were increasingly making the same 
types of riskier loans; from 2001 to 2006, the percentage of subprime mort-
gage originations that constituted:  
  Low-documentation (or no-documentation) loans increased from 
28.5% to 50.8%; 
  ARMs jumped from 73.8% to 91.3%; 
  Interest-only mortgages increased from 0% to 22.8%.91
Together, these trends indicate that lenders were making the same 
types of loans in the same markets and simultaneously lowering underwrit-
ing standards.  This correlation of lending practices may explain (or exacer-
bate) the default correlations that studies have found in subprime loan port-
folios.92  Again, high default correlations in underlying mortgage loans can 
translate into unexpectedly and significantly higher defaults in securities 
backed by those loans.93
D.  The Crisis Spreads 
The current financial crisis exposed the dangers in these assumptions.  
The crisis has numerous causes and has unfolded (and continues to unfold) 
in incredibly complex ways that will occupy economists for decades.  The 
following paragraphs present merely a thumbnail sketch of the crisis to 
highlight how consumer mortgage defaults threatened the safety of finan-
cial institutions and created massive systemic risk. 
The subprime crisis began in 2007, when defaults on ARMs began ris-
ing as teaser rates on ARMs expired and many subprime borrowers were 
unable to make payments at the higher reset rate.94  Rising market interest 
St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2008-036A, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1286106 (finding no deterioration of lending stan-
dards after 2004).  
89 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 29, at 40.     
90 Giovanni Dell’Ariccia et al., Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Sub-
prime Mortgage Market (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research, Discussion Paper No. DP6683, 2008), available 
at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf08rtmfs/aricciaiganlaeven.pdf.  
91 Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Law and Economic Issues in Subprime Litigation (Harvard Law 
School, John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 612, 2008), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ferrell_et_al_612.pdf.  
92 See supra notes 13, 76, 77 and accompanying text.  
93 Supra notes 13, 74, 75, 78 and accompanying text. 
94 Gretchen Morgenson, Home Loans: A Nightmare Grows Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at 
C1.  
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rates cut off the exit options for borrowers by both making refinancing pro-
hibitively expensive and drying up the resale market; home prices began to 
level or drop in many markets after years of continuous gains.95 Waves of 
defaults by mortgage borrowers followed.96
The wave of defaults swelled enough to affect even senior classes of 
mortgage-backed securities.97  Defaults on asset-backed securities triggered 
guarantees and credit insurance policies, and unprepared guarantors and 
credit insurers themselves threatened to falter.98      
Growing losses for financial institutions on mortgages and mortgaged-
backed securities created two aftershocks.  First, lenders cut back on mort-
gage and other lending, which drove market interest rates higher and started 
a credit crunch.  Higher interest rates created a feedback loop and worsened 
default rates on ARMs.99
Second, the plummeting of the value of asset-backed securities forced 
many financial institutions to make substantial write-downs of assets on 
their balance sheets, a process that still continues.100  Yet the value of many 
of these assets became extremely uncertain, as buyers for asset-backed se-
curities disappeared.101  In addition, the iteration of securitization upon se-
curitization meant that the default of one class of securitization cascaded 
and caused losses in subsequent securitizations.  But, the many layers of 
securitization—CDOs backed by CDOs in an iterative chain—prevented 
investors later in the securitization chain from calculating the risk they 
faced from losses on assets earlier in the chain.102   
95 Id.; see also Jia Lynn Yang, How Bad is the Mortgage Crisis Going to Get?, CNNMONEY.COM,
Mar. 17, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/14/news/economy/krugman_ 
subprime.fortune/index.htm.    
96 Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, (Magazine),at 36.  
97 Robert Stowe, Anatomy of a Meltdown, 68 MORTGAGE BANKING 38 (Oct. 1, 2007), available 
at 2007 WLNR 21537515; Greg B. Cioffi, Collateralized Damage, DAILY DEAL, Feb 1, 2008, available 
at 2008 WLNR 1910083. 
98 Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bond Insurer in Turmoil Turns to Familiar Lender, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2008, at C2. 
99 Shawn Tully, Risk Returns with a Vengeance, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2007, at 50. 
100 Charles Duhigg, A Trickle that Turned into a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at C1 (report-
ing that major banks are writing down 20% to 50% of the value of their assets due to losses from mort-
gage-backed securities). 
101 Louise Story, A Values Debate (Not the Political Kind), N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at C1 
(reporting on debate over whether mark to market rule in Financial Accounting Statement 157 was 
leading to overstated  write downs); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Are Bean Counters to Blame?¸ N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C1.  
102 Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 22, 2007, at 50 
(linking Bear Stearn’s deteriorating credit situation to the decline in value of “CDO squared” securities 
it held). 
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The write-down of assets began to affect the creditworthiness, real and 
perceived, of many institutional investors.103  Many investors were forced to 
sell asset-backed securities to improve their balance sheets,104 but they faced 
a liquidity risk problem similar to that of holders of mortgages; the initial 
depression of prices of asset-backed securities, combined with the volume 
of sellers in the market in the same predicament, sent the prices of these 
securities into a tailspin and dried up liquidity. 105
Creditors, including stock lending and derivative counter-parties, be-
gan worrying about the credit risk posed by many institutions and made 
margin calls.106  Many large commercial and investment banks were forced 
to seek emergency equity infusions to shore up their balance sheets, reas-
sure creditors, and meet regulatory capital requirements.107   
A few prominent institutions failed in attempts to stay afloat.108
Threats to the solvency of financial institutions and hedge funds created 
fears of systemic risk due to domino effects.  The failure of one firm could 
trigger the collapse of other institutions because of the complex web of 
counter-party risk created by derivatives.109  Even perceived risk posed a 
threat; the contagion of depositor or creditor panic further exacerbated sys-
temic risk.110  The failure or threat of failure to these large institutions 
prompted extraordinary federal intervention into financial markets. 
IV. MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK THROUGH CONSUMER PROTECTION
A.  Enlisting Consumer Protection as a Tool for Mitigating Systemic Risk 
Consumer loans drove securitization and consumer defaults drove the 
financial crisis.  Part III provides a sketch of the chain that connected de-
faults on consumer mortgages with the collapse of major financial institu-
103 Landon Thomas, Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2008, at A1 (describing contagious loss of investor and creditor confidence in U.S. investment 
banks).
104 Liz Rappaport & Justin Lahart, Debt Reckoning: U.S. Receives a Margin Call, WALL. ST. J., 
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1.  
105 E.g., Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Are Squeezed By Investors and Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
20, 2007 at C1. 
106 Id. 
107 E.g., David Jolly, After Losses, UBS Seeks to Raise $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008 at 
C5; Eric Dash, IndyMac Announces It Will Close Lending Units and Cut Half of Its Work Force, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C3. 
108 Goldstein & Henry, supra note 102 (reporting on bailout of Bear Stearns); Dash, supra note 
107 (reporting on insolvency of IndyMac Bank).  
109 Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, Securities 
Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL 15, 22 (Hal S. Scott ed., 
2005) (discussing systemic risk threat posed by securities firms by virtue of OTC derivatives activity). 
110 Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2007, at C1 (reporting that potential failure of Bear Stearns hedge fund raised investor concerns 
over systemic risk).  
2009] Link Between Consumer Financial Protection, Systemic Risk 453
tions and threats to global financial markets.  This chain also underscores 
how adequate consumer financial laws can protect not only consumers from 
excessive risk, but markets from excessive systemic risk as well.  Had con-
sumers been restricted to mortgages that they could have afforded, the fi-
nancial crisis may have been less severe or perhaps would never have 
started.  Mitigating systemic risk adds an altogether different justification 
for strong consumer financial laws and vigorous enforcement of those laws.  
Consumer financial protection is thus not only about protecting unsophisti-
cated individuals—the proverbial “widows and orphans”—from risky 
loans, but about protecting financial markets as well.111
Consumer financial laws can address systemic risk by working at ei-
ther end of the securitization chain.  Most directly, regulations can address 
the practices of lenders by requiring better disclosure to consumers, prohi-
biting certain loan terms, or addressing underwriting standards.112  But, as 
several legal scholars have noted, consumer protection can also be achieved 
by addressing the demand for asset-backed securities by investors.113  For 
example, a legal rule that restricted financial institutions from purchasing 
securities backed by mortgages with a high risk of default would dry up the 
capital that fed exotic, excessively risky, and exploitative mortgages. 
B.  The Costs and Tensions of Reorienting Consumer Financial Protection 
A detailed proposal for new consumer financial laws is beyond the 
scope of this Article (Part IV.F sketches one suggestion).  Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that strengthening consumer financial protection laws 
may come at a cost.  Protecting consumers (and financial markets) from 
risky loans is in tension with other objectives of consumer and other finan-
cial regulation.  Most obviously, stronger consumer financial protection 
may reduce consumer access to credit.114
111 U.S. bank regulators seem to be very tentatively recognizing the connection between consumer 
protection and safety-and-soundness.  Notably, in 2006, the Federal Reserve and other federal bank 
regulators issued guidance that suggested to financial institutions that they both make enhanced disclo-
sures to consumers who borrow under exotic mortgages and adopt enhanced underwriting standards for 
such mortgages.  These recommendations were based on both consumer protection and safety-and-
soundness objectives.  See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Interagency Guidance on 
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58, 609 (Oct. 4, 2006).  However, this guidance 
was non-binding.    
112 See id.  In other words, regulators could clarify and strengthen the standards in the Interagency 
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks and make them binding. 
113 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 80; Peterson, supra note 80. 
114 Gregory Elliehausen & Michael Staten, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analy-
sis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 411 (2004) (finding a 
1999 North Carolina statute prohibiting certain “predatory” mortgages caused lenders to sharply restrict 
lending to high risk borrowers and arguing against this restricted access to credit).  
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Second, as noted above, stronger consumer protection may reduce the 
profitability of financial institutions.115  Thus, muscular consumer financial 
protection laws may have some theoretical adverse long-term consequences 
for systemic risk.  In addition, if consumer protection laws would drive 
financial institutions out of a broad class of investments, they might also 
undermine diversification by those institutions.  Yet, it is also important to 
reiterate that the threat of consumer financial protection laws to the safety 
and soundness of financial institutions remains largely theoretical; there is 
scant, hard, empirical evidence that consumer financial protection regula-
tions increase systemic risk.   
Nevertheless, reorienting consumer financial laws to protect financial 
markets from systemic risk may not mesh completely with the traditional 
objective of protecting consumers.  Mitigating systemic risk might not nec-
essarily equate with lowering consumer defaults, but instead might focus on 
the narrower goals of making defaults more predictable by financial institu-
tions and less correlated.116
C.  Alternative Explanations: What If Financial Institutions Had Greater       
   Information on the Risk of Consumer Default?  
This raises the question of whether strengthened consumer financial 
protection is necessary to prevent a recurrence of the financial crisis.  
Would financial institutions be able to mitigate the risk they face from loans 
that pose excessive risks to consumers merely by having better quality in-
formation on those loans?117
Questions remain as to whether information alone would cause these 
investors to refrain from purchasing excessively risky securities backed by 
consumer debt.  Scholars have argued that managers at institutional inves-
tors took on excessive risk with these securities because of misaligned in-
centives between these managers and the institution’s shareholders and 
creditors; poorly designed executive compensation figures prominently in 
this explanation.118  Executives at financial institutions may have faced 
115 Levitin, supra notes 9, 43, 44 and accompanying text.  This tension mirrors a conundrum that 
dogs various potential regulatory responses to the crisis; regulatory measures needed to ensure that the 
crisis does not recur are in tension with crisis management and policies that promote the viability of 
financial institution in the short-term.    
116 Cf. notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
117 The global financial crisis stemmed from multiple failures of markets and regulations; one 
alternative policy prescription—that investors in securitizations primarily need better information about 
the risks associated with assets underlying securities—has gained particular traction among policymak-
ers and scholars.  For example, many proposals focus on improving the quality of rating agency ratings.  
See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk after the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for 
Rating Agency Accountability, __ N.C. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2009).  
118 See Executive Compensation II: CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (Mar. 7 2008) (Testimony of Dr. Susan M. 
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some pressure not to resist the herd mentality of financial institutions that 
drove asset-backed security prices higher; 119 it is a career risk to bet against 
a bubble.  In addition, even executives and sophisticated traders at financial 
institutions may be subject to the same types of behavioral biases that afflict 
consumers.120
The preceding paragraph suggested that agency costs and behavioral 
biases may combine to induce individuals at financial institutions to invest 
in risky consumer debt even when they are armed with better information 
on the risks involved.  This argues that consumer financial laws may play a 
necessary role in mitigating systemic risk by restricting consumer lending 
practices that lead to excessive and highly correlated consumer defaults. 
D.  “Predatory Lending” as a Commons Problem and Anti-coordination            
      Game
There is an alternative economic justification for consumer financial 
laws that address systemic risk, which is based on the logic of collective 
action.  Each consumer lender, on its own, lacks sufficient incentives and 
ability to curtail lending practices that may exacerbate systemic risk.  Each 
lender has an incentive to maximize returns from its consumer borrowers 
and may be punished with lower market share for doing so.  But, these 
lending practices, when adopted by many lenders in the market, can lead to 
unpredictable, high, and highly correlated defaults by consumers.  As noted 
above, waves of consumer defaults can threaten financial markets.121  This 
represents a classic collective action failure characterized by lenders that 
neither bear the full cost of their actions (i.e., their lending practices have 
negative externalities) nor are able to coordinate their actions with other 
lenders to refrain collectively from lending practices.122  The following pa-
ragraphs present several versions of these problems. 
Wachter, Richard B. Worley Professor of Financial Management, Professor of Real Estate and Finance, 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080307103022.pdf. 
119 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and Credit Crunch, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 77 (2009).  Professor Brunnermeier cites the now infamous quote by Citigroup CEO 
Charles Prince: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.  But as long as 
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.  We’re still dancing.” 
120 See, e.g., Robert A. Olsen, Implications of Herding Behavior for Earnings Estimation, Risk 
Assessment, and Stock Returns, 52 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 37 (1996) (finding that expert financial analysts 
engage in herding). 
121 Supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.  
122 Professor Schwarcz has characterized all efforts to mitigate systemic risk as a “commons 
problem.”  Schwarcz, supra note 8. 
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Consumer Wealth as Commons 
Each individual consumer represents a potential source of revenue for 
multiple lenders and, thus, resembles a classic commons.  Each lender can 
exploit the consumer and extract additional revenue, but the combination of 
several exploitative loans may cause the consumer to default.  Of course, 
lenders can protect themselves before extending a loan by examining the 
credit report of a borrower.  Credit reports typically contain information on 
the identity of other lenders, amount borrowed and payment history.123  But, 
they lack detailed information on the terms of outstanding loans, and, as 
consumer law scholars have noted, the devil is in those details.  Consumer 
loan contracts can contain complicated interest rates, penalties or fee provi-
sions that could increase a consumer’s risk of default and, in severe cases, 
becoming insolvent.124  But, the complex and often bespoke nature of these 
contractual provisions would frustrate including information on them in a 
standard credit report.  One solution for this critical gap in information, 
which might be called the “consumer loan terms information gap,” is dis-
cussed below in Part IV.F.
Correlated Consumer Loan Practices and Correlated Consumer Defaults 
Lenders face a collective action problem not only with respect to indi-
vidual borrowers, but also with respect to groups of borrowers in the mar-
ket.  Lenders face a strong incentive to mimic lucrative lending practices—
from types of mortgages to specific provisions in a credit card contract—
that other lenders have used to extract value from consumers.125  But, when 
practices of different lenders become highly correlated across the market-
place, consumer defaults may become highly correlated as well, exacerbat-
ing systemic risk.126
123 Robert B. Avery, Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, FED. RES. BULL. 297 (Summer 
2004) (detailing contents of consumer credit report), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/summer04_credit.pdf.  
124 E.g. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1. 
125 Supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.  See Martin Neil Baily, The Origins of the 
Financial Crisis, Initiative on Business & Public Policy at Brookings, Fixing Finance Series Paper 3 
(Nov. 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/11_ 
origins_crisis_baily_litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf (positing a theory of mortgage originator 
behavior based on information cascades and bubble dynamics).  The authors of this Brookings study 
elaborate on how mortgage originators and other actors in the mortgage markets may have engaged in 
herd behavior. 
In a marketplace where individuals observe the actions of others, herding behavior may trump the 
judgment of rational individuals. This kind of “social contagion” can go a long way in describing how 
homeowners, mortgage originators, holders of mortgage-backed securities, regulators, ratings agen-
cies—indeed everyone—could get swept up in a bubble that ex post was clearly bound to burst.   
Id.  Cf. Raghuram G. Rajan, Why Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence, 109 Q.
J. ECON. 399-442 (1994) (presenting evidence of herding in bank lending standards).  
126 Supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
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ARMs and other exotic mortgages in the subprime provide a stark ex-
ample of correlated lending practices leading to correlated defaults.  The 
unfolding of the subprime crisis described in Part III.D above also demon-
strates how consumer defaults can become even more highly correlated 
through spillover effects and feedback loops.  Spillover effects occur when 
the default on one consumer loan creates direct, negative externalities that 
increase the probability that other consumers will also default.127  For ex-
ample, data shows that a foreclosed house lowers the value of other houses 
in the neighborhood128  A precipitous drop in home value below the value of 
mortgages may induce other mortgage borrowers to default.  Feedback 
loops occur when consumer defaults trigger a series of events that can indi-
rectly lead to a subsequent wave of defaults.  Part III.D gives the example 
of ARM defaults caused by rising interest rates, which leads to losses by 
financial institutions, who cut back lending, which leads to higher interest 
rates, which can lead to a new round of ARM defaults.  The complexity of 
the terms of these consumer mortgages (in addition to the complexity 
caused by securitization) combined with these spillover effects and feed-
back loops makes modeling the risks posed by consumer loans extremely 
difficult.129   
Consumer Unpredictability and Behavioral Biases 
Modeling and measuring the risks to financial institutions of consumer 
loans faces further complications due to the behavioral biases of consum-
ers.130  To the extent that these behavioral biases play a significant role in 
consumer borrowing decisions, they also frustrate the ability of financial 
institutions to predict consumer behavior, including consumer defaults.  
Behavioral economics has faced a trenchant criticism, most prominently 
articulated in the legal literature by Professor Gregory Mitchell,131 that be-
havioral economics presents general tendencies, but has yet to delineate the 
boundaries of those tendencies.132  In other words, behavioral economics 
127 For a lengthy discussion of the spillover effects that might lead to a high degree of correlation 
among consumer defaults and defaults on asset-backed securities, see Hellwig, supra note 79.  
128 Adam Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy,
2009 WIS. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2009). 
129 Gerding, supra note 12.  
130 Supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.  
131 See Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral Law 
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781 (2003) (arguing that behavioral law and economics proponents 
have documented “tendencies” in behavioral biases, but has yet to specify the “boundaries” of those 
tendencies, i.e. when, and the extent to which, these biases come into play).  See also Richard A. Posner, 
Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-60 (1998) (faulting 
behavioral law and economics scholars for failing to offer a theory capable of generating testable predic-
tions that would rival the predictive power of rational-choice economics). 
132 Mitchell, supra note 131, at 1804-11. 
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produces evidence that behavioral biases occur, but has not specified when 
those biases occur.133  This failure to specify boundary conditions means 
that behavioral economics struggles to produce models of human behavior 
that can lead to testable predictions.134
This criticism applies not only to the modeling of behavioral econom-
ics scholars, but to the modeling used by financial institutions to predict 
consumer and investor behavior, as well.  Prediction of human behavior by 
financial institutions is frustrated by the lack of defined boundaries to beha-
vioral biases.  This lack of definition obscures the thresholds and magnitude 
of the effects of behavioral biases.  Thus, the higher the probability that a 
behavioral bias will be salient in a given context, the more uncertainty it 
adds to predictions by financial institutions of consumer behavior.135
In fact, evidence from the subprime crisis suggests that even originat-
ing mortgage lenders struggled to predict consumer defaults.  Insolvencies 
and severe losses by mortgage lenders on mortgages that they retained or 
were unable to offload quickly enough136 suggest that mortgage originators 
severely miscalculated the level and timing of consumer defaults. 
The Shape of Consumer Financial Protection: “Menu Design”, Standardi-
zation, and Systemic Risk 
Scholars have proposed different policies to mitigate the risk that be-
havioral biases will lead consumers to unwise decisions.  A full discussion 
of potential changes to consumer lending laws is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Nevertheless, one approach to addressing consumer behavioral bi-
ases might prove particularly effective in also addressing systemic risk.  
Scholars have proposed rules to that address the design of “menus” of con-
tractual choices available to consumers.137  These rules would not necessari-
ly prevent consumers from entering into unfavorable transactions.  Instead, 
menu design proposals focus on how information is presented to individu-
als.138  This could be combined with crafted default rules (including careful-
ly selected opt-in and opt-out provisions) that would counteract or harness 
the behavioral biases of consumers.139  Better menu design would dissuade 
consumers from agreeing to loan provisions that pose excessive risk.  By 
133 Id.
134 Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded for 
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 122-23 (2002). 
135 Gerding, supra note 12. 
136 John Kiff & Paul S. Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in 
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 07-188, 2007, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07188.pdf. 
137 Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2006).    
138 Id.
139 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1159 (2003).    
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lowering the risk of unpredictable and highly correlated consumer default, 
these provisions would also mitigate systemic risk. 
Menu-design proposals would have another benefit for addressing sys-
temic risk by encouraging more standardization in consumer loan contracts.  
Greater standardization would address the “consumer loan terms informa-
tion gap” mentioned above.  Again, lenders considering extending a loan to 
a consumer may be concerned that the consumer’s existing loan contracts 
may contain complex, fine print provisions that increase the risk of the bor-
rower defaulting on multiple loans.  Standardization would provide a way 
of categorizing these provisions so that they could appear on more nuanced 
credit reports. 
V. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS: THE REDESIGN OF THE FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Beyond substantive reform of specific laws, the link between consum-
er financial protection and systemic risk also has important implications for 
the current debate on redesigning the institutional framework for financial 
regulation in the United States (as well as in other countries).  The global 
financial crisis has sparked calls for dramatically reorganizing the responsi-
bilities of financial regulators.  Scholars and policymakers have called va-
riously for a single financial regulator or for a new financial regulator that 
would oversee all systemic risk regulation.140 Alternatively, the “Twin 
Peaks” model would split regulatory responsibility in two;141 a consumer 
regulator would oversee consumer financial protection142 and a separate 
regulator would address the safety and soundness.143
Arguments for the Twin Peaks model and against a single financial 
regulator include that the consumer financial protection and systemic risk 
regulation are missions that require different expertise.144  Moreover, plac-
ing these two missions under the same regulatory umbrella might allow the 
agency to bow to political pressure and subtly favor one mission over the 
140 See Editorial, It’s the Regulations, Not the Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A30 
(criticizing calls for single financial regulator or systemic risk regulator).    
141 See Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Finan-
cial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 237 (2007) 
(surveying European nation approaches to division of financial regulatory authority). 
142 For scholarly proposals for the creation of a federal regulator with consolidated responsibility 
for consumer financial protection, see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1; Heidi Mandanis Schooner, 
Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43 (2005).   
143 A third alternative would be to have three regulators: one responsible for stability of financial 
markets, a second responsible for prudential regulation, and a third for business conduct of financial 
firms (including consumer protection). U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT OF A MODERNIZED 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 137 (Mar. 2008). 
144 For a policy analysis of the tradeoffs among the Twin Peaks, single regulator and functional 
regulatory models, see Eric J. Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation: The Case of Canada,
Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 250 (Jan. 2009).  
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other.  As Professor Levitin notes, public choice theory suggests that con-
sumer financial protection is likely to end up on the losing side of that fight.  
When conflicts arise on a consumer protection regulation, a smaller number 
of financial institutions with a high stake in lower regulation would exercise 
more political muscle than a diffuse band of less-informed and less-
organized consumers.145       
The connections explored in this Article between consumer financial 
protection and systemic risk demonstrate the need, at the very least, for 
heavy coordination between a consumer financial regulator and a systemic 
risk regulator.  But, public choice theory again suggests that the consumer 
financial regulator may lose in the inevitable interagency conflicts or oth-
erwise be hobbled in carrying out its mission.  A systemic risk regulator 
may miss the connections between consumer protection and systemic risk.  
This argues for statutory provisions that give extra weight to consumer fi-
nancial protection regulations vis-á-vis perceived conflicts with safety and 
soundness regulations.   
Yet, there are problems with the larger project of consolidating finan-
cial regulation into one, two, or a few neat organizational boxes.  The re-
maining paragraphs of this Article sketch out a few arguments that may run 
counter to prevailing wisdom on ways to clear the current thicket of finan-
cial regulations.     
A.  Virtues of Regulatory Diversity 
As noted above, high correlations in consumer lending practices create 
a risk of high correlations in consumer defaults.146  Similarly, high correla-
tions in the investment portfolios of financial institutions create the risk of 
market disruptions generating market-wide sell-offs.147  Correlations in the 
behavior of financial institutions thus exacerbate systemic risk. 
Ensuring that different financial institutions are subject to different 
regulatory regimes can break down these correlations in financial institution 
behavior.  However, building diversity into regulation requires a holistic 
approach, not least because the ability of financial institutions to engage in 
regulatory arbitrage—for example, by choosing their regulator or regulatory 
regime—could undermine the objective of diversity.148  Financial institu-
tions may flock to one regulatory regime (perhaps the most permissive or 
perhaps the most “efficient”).  Regulators may adopt similar regulatory 
approaches in order to compete with one another.  Even if regulatory diver-
145 Levitin, supra note 9. 
146 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.  
147 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  
148 E.g., supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing ability of national banks to export 
home state usury laws).  
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sity is hardwired into the system, the free flow of capital might mean that 
capital and risk might still remain concentrated in a few firms or in a few 
regulatory regimes.  In short, breaking the correlation of financial institu-
tion practices with regulatory diversity presents challenges.  
B.  Virtues of Regulatory Redundancy 
The calls, particularly in the United States for pruning the thicket of 
financial regulators and financial regulators, may ignore the value of some 
level of redundancy among regulations and among regulators.  If there is 
only one regulator responsible for protecting consumers or mitigating sys-
temic risk, a failure by that regulator, whether due to incompetence or regu-
latory capture, would prove catastrophic.  Engineers build some level of 
redundancy into any critical architecture, be it a bridge or an information 
technology system.149
Of course, excessive redundancy in the financial regulatory architec-
ture entails serious costs, including the costs mentioned in Part IV.B above 
(e.g., lower consumer access to credit and higher burdens on financial insti-
tutions).  But, leaving a single regulatory line of defense to systemic risk 
can prove even more costly, particularly if the threat takes a non-obvious 
path, such as the paths this Article outlines between consumer defaults to 
systemic risk.     
C.  Arguments Against Preemption 
The preceding paragraphs discuss the virtues of regulatory diversity 
and regulatory redundancy in a theoretical context.  But, they can have 
more immediate and concrete applications.  For example, these virtues ar-
gue for giving both consumer regulators and systemic risk regulators over-
lapping responsibility for regulating lending practices that might transfer 
excessive risk to consumers.  These two virtues also argue for a continued 
role of state consumer financial regulations in addition to federal regulation 
and against blanket federal preemption of state consumer law.150
VI. CONCLUSION
The subprime crisis has demonstrated the need to see protection of 
consumers from excessively risky credit products as a fundamental tool for 
mitigating systemic risk.  This additional role for consumer protection adds 
to the quiver of policymakers, scholars, and advocates who have been con-
cerned with diluted and under-enforced consumer financial laws.   
149 See, e.g., ROY BILLINTON & RONALD N. ALLAN, RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF ENGINEERING 
SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 85-86 (1992) (analyzing reliability of parallel systems).  
150 See supra notes 25-29, 46-50 and accompanying text.  
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This Article attempted merely to sketch the connection between con-
sumer protection and systemic risk and begin to draw out some of the subs-
tantive and institutional regulatory implications of this connection.  But, 
several key avenues for research remain, including the following: 
  Providing more empirical evidence of correlations among subprime 
lending products and practices in the last 15 years; 
  Considering whether ongoing consolidation in the financial sector      
will further increase correlations in consumer defaults; 
  Investigating consumer default correlations and their causes, partic-
ularly during the subprime crisis; 
  Fleshing out how menu-design and a default rule may address be-
havioral biases in consumer credit decisions, make consumer beha-
vior more predictable, and protect consumers; and 
  Analyzing whether particular state laws were effective in reducing 
consumer defaults in subprime markets or making defaults less cor-
related. 
